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Lunar Prospector: Against All Odds

[ Part 1 | Part 2 | Part 3 | Part 4 | Epilogue | Appendices ]

Images are all approximately 100kb in size so please be patient.

+ Appendices 1-1 through 1-6

Appendix 1-1: The article that appeared in the JSC/NASA Space news Roundup, announcing the Lunar Prospector Project and asking for volunteer help in developing the spacecraft and doing the mission. View image

Appendix 1-2: The letter Preston Carter and I wrote to the Space Studies Institute (SSI), expressing our concerns about the poor performance of the SSI members of the Lunar Prospector Team and the need to replace them with competent personnel. View image

Appendix 1-3: A draft of the memo that I sent to Gregg Maryniak at the Space Studies Institute regarding the need for Preston Carter to be the point-man between the Lunar Prospector Project and Omni Systems Inc. during the Lunar Prospector Spacecraft Design Study that Omni was to conduct. Note that in the 1st paragraph of Point 1, I stated that, “… one of the major goals of the Lunar Prospector Project to demonstrate a quicker, less costly and better way of doing lunar (and planetary) science missions.” Several years later, NASA announced the Discovery Program that was to determine how to do lunar and planetary missions “Faster, Better, Cheaper” and Lunar Prospector was selected as the first pear-reviewed, competitively selected Discovery Mission in February 1995.
Note also that, because we had so few resources in the “Early Years” of the project, Preston Carter and I used the back of the sheets on which I printed this draft to layout our organizational chart for our volunteer engineering organization, Lunar Exploration Inc., and the chart shows through from the back of the paper. View image 1, View image 2, View image 3

Appendix 1-4: Because of various Space Studies Institute (SSI) violations of the Consortium Agreement, which served as the basis for the cooperation between SSI and Lunar Exploration Inc. (LEI) on the Lunar Prospector Project, I wrote this draft of a letter to SSI, demanding changes in the Consortium Agreement that would rectify the situation. The draft was sent to Jay Cuclis, LEI’s pro bono lawyer at the firm of Vinson & Elkins, so he could prepare it as a legal document and send it to SSI. View image

Appendix 1-5: The solicitation letter that the Space Studies Institute (SSI) sent out in September 1990 that was sent to Preston Carter and me, by a friend, a couple of days after I drafted the letter reproduced in Appendix 1-4. This SSI letter again portrayed the Lunar Prospector Mission as solely an SSI venture, rather than a cooperative program between SSI and Lunar Exploration Inc. and confirmed that SSI had not lived up to its duties defined in the Consortium Agreement. Instead of starting to solicit the several million dollars that we needed for the construction of the spacecraft at the start of the Phase B Design Study in the fall of 1989, so we could start construction immediately after the completion of the design study in June 1990, SSI was starting a halfhearted attempt to solicit the money nearly a year late, a fact that added to the concerns that Preston and I had concerning SSI’s ability to support the project. View image

Appendix 1-6: A newspaper article that appeared in the Houston Post as a result of the Lunar Exploration Inc. Press Conference that was held on October 17, 1990. View image

+ Appendices 1-7 through 1-12

Appendix 1-7: A letter that Gregg Maryniak faxed to Preston Carter and me, justifiably complaining about statements that Preston had made in our less than successful Lunar Exploration Inc. Press Conference that was held on October 17, 1990 – statements that I too was unhappy about. That was the second time in the history of the project that Gregg and I were on the same side of an issue that related to the management of the project, rather than being opponents, as was usually the case. View image

Appendix 1-8: The letter from Yuri Semyenov indicating that NPO Energia wanted to commit to the launch of Lunar Prospector and wanted to invite us to go to Moscow in December 1990 to finalize the deal. View image

Appendix 1-9: The letter that Astronaut Tom Stafford wrote on behalf of the Lunar Prospector Project after we had presented our case to the Synthesis Group that Tom chaired. View image

Appendix 1-10: The letter from Wes Huntress in which he responded negatively, in typical NASA bureaucratic lingo, to a progress report that I had sent to NASA Administrator, Admiral Richard Truly somewhat earlier. View image

Appendix 1-11: The short rejection letter from John McMahon, President and CEO of Lockheed Missiles & Space Company, that I received in response to my request that Lockheed give the Lunar Prospector Project a million dollars and other forms of support. View image

Appendix 1-12: The cover letter for the Unsolicited Proposal that I sent to NASA requesting support for the Lunar Prospector Project.View image

+ Appendices 2-1

Appendix 2-1: The unsigned letter that Don Damon sent to me during the Lunar Prospector Proposal effort in the fall of 1994, confirming that Lockheed Launch Vehicles and Services would launch Lunar Prospector to its translunar trajectory on a Lockheed Launch Vehicle 2 (LLV2) with a Star 37 kick motor for $25 million. View image

+ Appendices 3-1 through 3-3

Appendix 3-1: The e-mail that NASA/Ames Scott Hubbard originally sent to Ames’ Dan Cathcart in a fit of childish anger, without bothering to find out what the fact of the situation were, and that Dan forwarded to Lockheed’s Maryann Williamson, that led to my being locked out of Lockheed like a common criminal. View image

Appendix 3-2: The “Whoops!” e-mail that Ames’s PR person, David Morse, sent to all the individuals involved in Scott’s Hubbard’s fiasco (Appendix 3-1) – except the victim, me – explaining that Lockheed’s Buddy Nelson had indeed properly informed NASA/Ames about my appearance in a Channel 4 TV interview and that he, David, had dropped the ball. View image

Appendix 3-3: The e-mail that Lockheed’s Maryann Williamson wrote in response to the Scott Hubbard’s e-mail (Appendix 3-1) that started the lockout procedure that ended with my being locked out of Lockheed like a common criminal for several days. View image

+ Appendices 4-1 through 4-7

Appendix 4-1: The letter I sent to Wes Huntress requesting the removal of Scott Hubbard from the Lunar Prospector Project. View image 1, View image 2

Appendix 4-2: The letter I sent to Lockheed’s Mel Brashears requesting that Lockheed split the $4 million fee that it was getting for the Lunar Prospector Project with my non-profit, tax-exempt institute, the Lunar Research Institute. View image

Appendix 4-3: Wes Huntress’ rejection letter to my request (Appendix 4-1) to have Scott Hubbard removed from the Lunar Prospector Project. View image

Appendix 4-4: The obsequious letter that Lockheed VP, Mike Coats, wrote to NASA Headquarters defending poor Scott Hubbard again my unjust allegations and my request to have him removed from the Lunar Prospector Project. View image

Appendix 4-5: My reply to Coats’ obsequious letter (Appendix 4-4). View image

Appendix 4-6: Lockheed’s rejection of my request that Lockheed split the $4 million fee that it was getting for the Lunar Prospector Project with my non-profit, tax-exempt institute, the Lunar Research Institute (see appendix 4-2). View image

Appendix 4-7: The unintelligible letter I got from NASA’s George Withbroe in response to my trying to make sure that NASA had enough money for the data reduction of Lunar Prospector data, in which it was “clear”, if one understood NASA gobbledygook, that there was no money for the reduction of the data. View image

+ Appendices E-1 through E-3

Appendix E-1: The letter I wrote to NASA Administrator, Dan Goldin, defending the “Faster, Better, Cheaper” approach to lunar and planetary missions in response to the attacks on it after the two Mars Mission failures in late 1999. View image

Appendix E-2: My testimony to the Congressional Committee on Science in response to the attacks on the “Faster, Better, Cheaper” approach to lunar and planetary missions after the two Mars Mission failures in late 1999. View image

Appendix E-3: The letter I wrote to Congressman Sensenbrenner after I testified to the Congressional Committee on Science regarding the utility of the “Faster, Better, Cheaper” approach to lunar and planetary missions and the need to reform NASA. View image


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